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Abstract
Poverty reduction is a primary goal of development policy. In large parts of the World
people have to live on meagre incomes and have limited access to infrastructure
services, such as mains water, safe sanitation, mains power supplies, maintained roads
and telephones. In response, more and more infrastructure provision has been opened
up to private investment over the last two decades and regulatory institutions have been
introduced to protect the public interest in the absence of state ownership. In this paper
the role of infrastructure regulation in poverty reduction is investigated drawing on the
published evidence. The conclusion is that the evidence is both patchy and sometimes
contradictory. There is mixed knowledge regarding the extent to which regulators
address poverty issues and about the results of regulatory decisions. The paper
concludes by proposing a future research agenda aimed at improving our understanding
of the ways in which infrastructure regulation impacts on poverty, with the objective of
improving actual regulatory policy in developing economies.
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1. Introduction
International development policy since the 1980s has emphasised privatisation, market
liberalisation and regulatory reform. Although much has now been written on the effects
of privatisation and market liberalisation (for a recent review of the literature see Parker
& Kirkpatrick, 2005), relatively less is known about the impact of state regulation
especially in terms of poverty reduction. The UN Millennium Goals require that global
poverty be reduced by 50% by 2015 and that health and education and the environment
be improved (UN, 2000). But the challenge is huge. The number of chronically poor may
range from 450 million to 900 million. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the World’s poorest region,
more than a half of the population lives on less than US$1 a day and globally one billion
lack access to safe, piped water supplies and 2.2 billion to proper sanitation. Around two
billion people are estimated to lack access to electricity supplies and inadequate
communications limit economic development. A recent report on the demand for
infrastructure services in developing countries between 2005 and 2010 suggested that
annual investment and maintenance costs could total, at a minimum, US$465bn per
annum, if services are to grow sufficiently to meet the demand (Fay & Yepes, 2003).
Another report, concentrating on water services, has put the annual investment needs in
developing countries as rising from US$75bn in 2001 to US$180bn, if the UN’s
Millennium Development Goals are to be met (Camdessus, 2003).
Improved basic infrastructure services are recognised to be a crucial part of economic
development (Kessides, 2004). Where power supplies, water and sanitation,
telecommunications, ports and airports and road and rail links are poor and unreliable
the scope for economic development is severely curtailed. The promotion of economic
growth needs more investment in and improved management of infrastructure, hence
the arguments for privatisation. However, a prerequisite of successful privatisation of
monopoly activities is effective and efficient regulation. At the same time, there is
growing recognition that if the economic reforms are to have their intended effects of
raising economic growth and reducing poverty, there needs to be a commensurate
improvement in regulatory governance. Inefficiencies in state regulation have been
identified as a major cause of poor economic performance (World Bank, 2004).
This paper focuses on economic regulation and particularly the regulation of prices,
outputs and service quality. In the first section of the paper we consider how regulation
could be used to advance the reduction of poverty. We then turn to the existing evidence
on regulation and poverty reduction. We find that the existing knowledge is patchy, at
best. While much has now been written about regulation in developing countries,
especially in relation to the privatisation of infrastructure, little of this has focused
specifically on the poverty agenda. We conclude by providing an agenda for future
research into regulation and poverty reduction in developing countries with the aim of
improving our knowledge of the extent to which regulators address poverty issues and
about the results of their regulatory decisions on poverty levels.
2. How regulation can help the poor
The causes of poverty are complex and are subject to vigorous and sometimes
acrimonious debate about the origins and types of poverty (Sen, 1981, chapter 2; Hulme
& Cooke, 2002). A distinction is often made between absolute and relative poverty, the
former being concerned with average real GDP per capita and the latter with the
distribution of income and wealth in a country (the variance in real GDP per capita). That
the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction is complex and not
highly predictable is now recognised (Mbabazi, Morrissey, & Milner, 2003; UNDP, 2002,
p.23). Economic growth may be important in terms of reducing absolute poverty but
may not, in itself, address relative poverty. For example, Kuznets (1955) suggested that
there was an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and income
inequality. At relatively low levels of per capita income there was a positive relationship
between economic growth and inequality, but once a higher level of income was
achieved then inequality began to decline. However, empirical studies have been
inconsistent in finding such a U-shaped relationship (see Cook & Uchida, 2005, p.2 for a
review). Some literature suggests that growth creates inequalities, but these can be
offset by the effect of higher national income on reducing absolute poverty (see the
survey of the literature on growth and inequality by Berg & Krueger, 2003; also Dollar &
Kraay, 2002, 2004; Srinivasan & Wallack, 2004).
A study involving 121 countries for the years 1960–2000 has suggested that economic
growth is positively related to the stock of infrastructure assets and that income
inequality falls with higher infrastructure quantity and quality. Hence, despite the
uncertainty about the precise relationship between economic growth and privatisation,
developing basic infrastructure services seems to be a highly effective means of
combating poverty. As the authors of the study state: “the conclusion that infrastructure
both raises growth and lowers income inequality implies that infrastructure development
may be a key win–win ingredient for poverty reduction” (Calderon & Serven, 2004,
p.26). For regulation to address poverty reduction, it needs to tackle both absolute
poverty – by stimulating economic growth – and relative poverty by addressing
affordability and access to public services. As affordability and access are usually directly
under the control of regulators, we can refer to a direct effect on relative poverty.
However, only indirectly does regulation impact on economic growth, for example,
though the impact of regulation on private investment decisions (Kirkpatrick, Parker, &
Zhang, 2006a).
Regulatory reform in developing countries needs to address the design of pricing and
access policies which balance economic efficiency and social equity (World Bank, 1994).
In developing countries there are a number of potential regulatory challenges. These
are, firstly, to achieve adequate access by the poor to vital services. The poor often do
not have access to safe water and sanitation, telecommunications or mains power,
especially in rural areas. Secondly, the related issue of affordability of public services is
of concern. Where the marginal cost of expanding supply exceeds the marginal revenue
that the poor can afford to pay, services will be deficient; but regulators do not have
access to funds to pay direct subsidies and may be restricted in the extent to which they
can enforce cross-subsidies between richer and poorer consumer groups, especially
where markets are being opened to competition. New entrants will tend to target the
higher priced, more profitable markets. This can lead to a disconnect between economic
efficiency and social goals. Thirdly, regulatory offices in developing countries may be
very understaffed and staff may lack proper training, leading to inadequate regulatory
capacity. Finally, regulation can create what is known as regulatory risk, which can have
a sharply adverse effect on private investment. This links to the adequacy of the
protection of private property rights in countries, the continuing commitment to
regulatory contracts by governments, and the issue of regulatory capture.
Economists tend to view government policy in terms of achieving allocative and technical
efficiency, leaving questions of income and wealth distribution to others. Regulators may
ignore issues of poverty and affordability if their agenda is purely concerned with
economic efficiency, perhaps because regulation is based on regulatory models from the
US and Europe introduced by donor agencies. However, in lower income countries the
welfare state tends to be little developed. Hence, it cannot be safely assumed that higher
prices, say, for water services, so as to relate charges more closely to marginal costs,
will be compensated for by larger welfare payments to the poor. Affordability will be
affected if services are priced higher while incomes remain depressed.
Important issues relating to infrastructure regulation and poverty reduction in developing
countries therefore include: the extent to which regulators in developing countries
prioritise access by the poor to vital services, and if and how the affordability issue is
addressed; what deficiencies in administrative and regulatory capacity exist and how
they impact on the ability of regulatory offices to deliver a poverty reduction strategy;
and what influences regulators when coming to regulatory decisions, including issues of
information about the needs of the poor and regulatory capture by elite interests.
We now attempt to shed light on these issues by reviewing the existing evidence on
infrastructure regulation and poverty reduction.
3. Infrastructure and poverty
Research into the characteristics and determinants of household poverty in developing
countries shows that the poor usually suffer from both a high degree of exclusion from
public infrastructure services and from the poor quality of those limited services to which
they do have access (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2003). Moreover, although in one sense the
urban and rural poor share a common poverty, there may be many regional and local
differences, in particular, typically rural areas are much less well served by infrastructure
services (Komivese, Whittington, & Wu, 2003). For example, in Sri Lanka it is claimed
that the reduction in poverty since the early 1990s has been slow and regionally uneven
and poverty alleviation programmes have become vehicles for political patronage at the
grassroots (Kelegama, 2003).
From the 1980s the deficit in developing countries in terms of infrastructure provision
has been tackled by donor bodies in part by promoting privatisation and market
liberalisation policies. The expectation is that privatisation will introduce superior private
sector management skills and scarce capital and thereby improve services and raise
economic growth. The hope is that privatisation will raise economic efficiency in sleepy
and sometimes corruption-ridden state enterprises. Undoubtedly there have been
successes. Where success has resulted, not only has the profitability of the firm risen,
benefiting shareholders, but prices have fallen and the quantity and quality of output has
increased. Governments have benefited from higher tax revenues and reduced subsidies
to loss making firms, leaving more government funds available to tackle poverty
(Bortolotti, D’Souza, Fantini, & Megginson, 2002; Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2004;
Estache, Gomez-Lobo, & Leipziger, 2000). Plane (1999) contends that the privatisation
of the Ivory Coast electricity company led to the introduction of more efficient
technologies. This in turn led to productivity gains and lower electricity prices. In some
cases there has been more direct evidence of benefits to the poor. One study has
suggested that the poorest groups seem to benefit the most from increased productivity
and access brought about by privatisation and related reforms (Benitez, Chisari, &
Estache, 2003). Galiani, Gertler, Schargrodsky, and Sturzenegger (2005) suggest that in
Argentina private sector involvement in the provision of water has led to an increase in
the number of households connected to supplies by 11.6% and a resulting fall in child
mortality of between 5% and 7%, and by 24% in the poorest municipalities. Similarly,
Leipziger, Fay,Wodon, and Yepes (2003) report that economic reforms have led to better
access to infrastructure services and this had been important in improving child health.
Claims have been made that any adverse effects on the poor in developing countries
resulting from privatisation and market liberalisation programmes have been greatly
exaggerated. Typical is the following conclusion: ‘There is no evidence that such reforms
hurt poor or rural consumers—at least in terms of access to services. Even when service
prices increase, the share of poor and rural households with connections does not
decrease. And in many cases coverage increases, possibly because connection fees fall
once service is no longer rationed. Indeed, case studies show that allowing entry and
competition in infrastructure services can dramatically increase services for poor people.”
(Kessides, 2005, p.27). However, while it does seem that privatisation and the arrival of
competition has often brought about widespread benefits to all consumer groups in
telecommunications, the evidence relating to other infrastructure industries is less
compelling. These industries are less conducive to cost-reducing technological change.
Notable in this respect is the water sector where competition in the market is ruled out
by the economics of water supply and sewerage services, particularly the high costs of
building supply facilities and the costs of pumping water and treating sewerage
(Kirkpatrick, Parker, & Zhang, 2006b) Also, there has been a tendency to extrapolate
from the experiences of one country and region (much of the published research relates
to Latin America) to developing economies generally. A conclusion that all income groups
in Argentina benefited from efficiency, quality of service and access improvements
following the privatisation of utilities (Chisari, Estache, & Romero, 1999) and that the
poorest groups may have benefited most (Benitez et al., 2003), for example, does not
necessarily mean that this result will apply in other countries.
It is to be expected that the results of reforms depend upon the nature and form that
they take and the local political, economic and regulatory environment. This turns
attention from simply looking at privatisation and market liberalisation as sufficient
reforms in themselves to concern with the quality of state regulatory regimes. Moreover,
because the poor are consumers and suppliers of labour, the effects of reforms need to
consider not just prices and outputs but employment levels, working conditions and
wages. A recent study of four Latin American economies suggested that privatisation had
had no clear effect on prices, but that there had been adverse distributive effects on the
poor because of redundancies in the privatised utilities. Suggestion that the poor still
gained because of increased access to better quality services seems to require a
judgement about welfare transfers between gainers and losers within the poor (McKenzie
& Mookherjee, 2003; Kessides, 2005, p.28). Birdsall and Nellis (2002), after reviewing
especially the results of reforms in the transition economies, have concluded that most
privatisation programmes seem to have worsened the distribution of assets and income,
at least in the short term. However, they suggest that this result is less clear for utilities
such as electricity and telecommunications because of increased access by the poor to
their services.
A number of other studies have also highlighted weaknesses in privatisations and the
subsequent state regulation of the new private operators in terms of addressing the
needs of the poor. In Manila the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage services was replaced
by two concessionaires in 1997. One, Maynilad Water Services, pulled out of the
concession in 2002. In the case of both concessions, strides were made to expand
services to the poor although at higher prices (Carino, 2005, p.12). In Sri Lanka
privatisation has often preceded the establishment of regulation “reflecting the
prominence accorded to fiscal imperatives and leading to unfavourable distributional
consequences” (Knight-John, 2005, p.3). A recent study of the welfare effects of utility
privatisation in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua suggests that prices both rose
and fell, but that there were adverse distributional effects on the bottom half of the
income distribution because of job losses in the privatised utilities. Offsetting this was an
improved quality of services, increased access for the poor and the changed structure of
the public finances, which benefited the poor more than others (McKenzie & Mookherjee,
2003).
Similarly, studies by Harris (2003) and Clarke and Wallsten (2002) suggest that
privatisation has had a marginal effect in terms of widening the access of the poor to
infrastructure. The collection of studies by Latin American scholars in Saha and Parker
(2002) provides numerous examples of worsened conditions for the poor and regulatory
failings following privatisation and market liberalisation policies in Latin America. The
study, by Foster, Tre, and Wodon (2001) suggests that reforms in the electricity sector
may not have benefited poorer households in rural areas. Clarke, Kosec, and Wallsten
(2004) find that connection rates to water and sewerage improved after the introduction
of private capital in Latin America no faster than in cities that retained public ownership
of their water systems. Other research into the performance of privatised water and
electricity utilities in developing countries has found a mixed picture with some
improvements, but with competition and regulation proving to be more important than
ownership in explaining the performance differences, especially so in electricity
generation (Zhang, Parker,& Kirkpatrick, 2002, 2005) and telecommunications
(Wallsten, 2001). Consistent with these findings, Gutierrez and Berg (2000) looking at
privatised telecommunications in Latin America and the Caribbean, concluded that the
quality of regulation is an important determinant of telecommunications density growing
quickly.
4. Regulation and poverty reduction
Calderon and Serven (2004) argue that inequality decreases with an increase in the
quantity and quality of infrastructure and that therefore infrastructure development can
be a highly effective means of combating poverty. But certain other studies have raised
doubts about whether the investment in infrastructure schemes resulting from
privatisation has reduced poverty through faster economic growth. Comparing 19 major
Latin American and Caribbean countries and two sets of comparator countries (fast
expanding East Asian economies and middle income developing countries and 21
industrial economies of the OECD), Calderon and Serven (2005) found that, across the
region, leaving aside telecommunications, private investment has failed to make good
the loss of public sector investment. The overall decline in investment in infrastructure in
Latin America can hardly have been positive for economic growth and by implication
longer term poverty reduction. In addition, privatisation of infrastructure has frequently
been associated with reduced employment reflecting over-manning under state
ownership (Mitlin, 2004, p.324, provides a number of examples; see also Bortolotti et
al., 2002). It is to be expected that many of those made redundant were lower paid
workers. Such evidence is also consistent with the evidence from the transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe where privatisation appears to have increased
economic efficiency but at the cost of higher unemployment and greater poverty.
Overall, the evidence suggests that regulation may have been ineffective in ensuring
that privatisation benefited the poorest groups.
This conclusion is supported by evidence from Latin America, often cited as a region
where privatisation of infrastructure has benefited the poor, but where serious regulatory
deficiencies have been identified: “a persistent complaint is echoed across the region:
the weakness of regulation hinders tariff negotiations, prevents erosion of monopoly
rents and hinders the sharing of productivity gains with consumers” (Ugaz & Waddams
Price, 2003, p.12). The privatisation of telephones in Argentina was accompanied by
very weak regulation with overlapping functions between the government department
and the new regulatory agency. The outcome of reform seems to have been that most
residential consumers gained from telecoms and electricity price changes, but that the
poorest received the lowest absolute gains and gained a lower than average proportion
of their incomes. In gas, water and sewerage there have been losses across the board
with the largest relative losses in income falling on the low-income groups. “In sum, in
the case of Argentina the effects of rebalancing in all the utilities seems to be regressive,
with the main negative effects on the poorest segment of the population” (Ugaz &
Waddams Price, 2003, p.15).
Elsewhere failures to benefit the poorest have also been recorded. For example, in
Ghana since 2003 the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission has tried to focus on social
policy, including issues of affordability and ensuring consumers access to safe, adequate,
efficient and non-discriminatory services especially for water services (Aryeetey &
Ahene, 2005, pp.17–18). However, the World Bank and the IMF imposed an automatic
water rate adjustment mechanism on PURC as part of a package of loan conditionalities.
This ensured that water rates adjusted automatically as the local currency appreciated or
depreciated against the dollar (Aryeetey & Ahene, 2005, pp.17–18). In the Philippines
the international financial institutions made electricity reform, including privatisation, a
condition for loans and other assistance. The result, it has been suggested, has been
reform that has failed to take into account the state of un-readiness of the economy and
its needs and has permitted only the Filipino elite and foreign investors to participate in
the process (Carino, 2005, p.5). A recent research report on infrastructure by Kessides
(2004) for the World Bank recognised regulatory failures and called for new regulatory
safeguards, including safety nets and tariff rebalancing schemes, with pricing policy
striking a balance between economic efficiency and social equity.
Where concession agreements are used in which the state contracts out the
management of infrastructure services to the private sector, contracts may or may not
prioritise poverty reduction. For example, exclusivity clauses in concession agreements
can make alternative supply sources, such as community standpipes and private wells,
illegal, impacting adversely on the poor (Ugaz, 2003, p.84). Service obligations can be
built into regulatory contracts to ensure that services are expanded into poorer areas.
However, it is just as possible that regulation will exacerbate poverty if such concerns do
not weigh highly within regulatory offices, particularly at a time when cross-subsidies are
removed after the introduction of competition (for a useful discussion of the issues, see
Chisari, Estache, & Waddams Price, 2003). Also, the benefits from concessions may be
dissipated by small numbers of firms bidding for contracts. This can lead to less
beneficial concessions for developing countries and, ex post the inauguration of the
contract, less effective regulation of services because of a lack of alternative suppliers
for government to turn to in the case of contract default. In such circumstances, the
terms and conditions imposed by bidding companies may run counter to a poverty
reduction agenda because expanding services to the poor may not be profitable. Also,
governments may not recognise the legality of dwellings in shanty towns within and
around major cities and, as a consequence, those living in squalid conditions may
continue to be deprived of services such as electricity, water and sewerage. However, it
is the case that a number of concession agreements have included service expansion
targets to benefit the poor, which again highlights the importance of effective regulation
in the design and monitoring of concession agreements.
Where failures exist in tackling poverty issues, the cause may lie not in the objectives of
the regulatory bodies but in a failure of regulatory capacity. For example, most
regulatory agencies in Asian countries have been created since 2001 and are ill-equipped
and employees are ill-trained to pursue effectively both economic efficiency and poverty
objectives. A recent survey of 13 Asian countries found that 80% of regulators had no
access to training and regulatory offices were usually understaffed. The report
concludes: “Asia’s governments rely too much on under-equipped and unsupported
independent regulators to carry out tasks that are beyond their capabilities” (Jacobs,
2004, p.4). In Ghana, a number of new independent regulatory institutions have been
created and authorised to carry out regulatory functions in order to protect the public
interest and promote fair competition. However, these new institutions have faced major
difficulties in attracting key professional staff as a result of the limited funding they have
received (Aryeetey, 2004, p.318). In Latin America there is often a lack of political
support for independent regulation and a lack of commitment to maintaining regulatory
independence (Ugaz, 2003). In countries such as Chile privatisation has not been
accompanied by sufficient effort to increase competition in the market (Paredes, 2003)
and competition policy cannot be relied upon in developing economies to control
privatised monopolies because competition law is either unformulated, inoperative or
subject to political intervention (Mehta et al., 2003). Another area of deficiency seems to
be economic and financial data. Without reliable data regulators find it difficult to
regulate effectively. Statistics at the sub-national level appear to be especially
inadequate, as was highlighted recently in a study which looked at the availability of
statistical data in countries such as Bolivia, Cambodia and Malawi (Paris21, 2004).
Where multinational companies are service providers, profits may be massaged through
transfer pricing schemes and companies may not provide comprehensive accounts at the
national level.
Also, regulatory policies may either backfire or be “captured”. For instance requiring
suppliers to provide services to the poor at the same price as to other consumers can
undermine any financial incentive to expand services. In Zimbabwe a failure to re-align
prices with long-run marginal costs compromised the planned expansion of the electricity
system (Mangwengwende, 2002). In Bangladesh further entry into some industries
including electricity was stopped by government on the grounds that there was already
adequate competition (Mehta et al., 2003, p.15). It is difficult not to conclude that rent
seeking groups with dominant positions in Bangladeshi markets were instrumental in
shaping this decision, providing an example of “regulatory capture”.
Counterbalanced against this, regulators in some countries have successfully adopted
pro-poor policies. In particular, Chile has operated a subsidy policy so that subsistence-
level water and sanitation services should account for no more than 5% of a household’s
income and eligibility for subsidies for a wide range of other services has been means
tested. In Peru pay phones in rural areas have received subsidies and the poor are more
likely to use pay phones. In India, village public telephones and public call offices have
been promoted in both urban and rural areas to make telecommunications more
accessible to the poor (Garg, Kabra, & Gulaty, 2003). In an attempt to promote
universal service the Brazilian Agency of Electrical Energy has decided that consumers
should no longer pay for electricity connection charges (ANEEL, 2003). Other examples
include a recent law passed in South Africa on water services, which states that every
household has the right to a certain amount of free water per day, and the introduction
in Buenos Aires of a bimonthly charge to spread the cost of new water connections over
five years, interest free. This was specifically introduced to make water services more
accessible to the poor (although it may have had the side-effect of curbing the expansion
of the water network; Alcazar, Xu, & Zuluaga, 2000). Further measures were introduced
in 2002 including social tariffs which benefit most pensioners and the poor in specific
areas.
What is little covered in the existing literature is a discussion of the legal requirements of
regulatory offices in developing countries in relation to pro-poor issues. An exception is a
recent study of regulation in Ghana, which reveals that the law requires that when
negotiating prices the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission takes into account the
consumer interest, investor interest, costs of production, the financial integrity of the
public utility, the economic development of the country, the best use of natural
resources, uniformity of prices across the country, and competition amongst utility
companies (Aryeetey, 2004, p.302). However, it is not clear from this long list where
poverty reduction features and what weighting, if any, it receives in practice. In other
cases it may be that regulators have no specific mandate to pursue the poverty agenda
but in reality do so. For example, in utility sectors in India “poverty alleviation is not on
the direct or indirect agenda of regulation. . . It is not a specified objective of regulation”
(Garg et al., 2003, p.7). However, many regulatory commissions in the electricity sector
in India seem nevertheless to have introduced innovative approaches linking electricity
access and tariffs to income (Garg et al., 2003, p.9). Government schemes such as the
Kutir Jyoti Programme established in 1998/99 exist to encourage electrification of
households below the poverty line.
5. Conclusions: a future research agenda
From the above review of the existing evidence it is clear that knowledge about
infrastructure regulation and its impact on poverty reduction is currently both patchy and
sometimes contradictory. In particular, where privatisation has occurred and regulatory
agencies introduced, much of the favourable evidence comes from Latin America in the
1990s. However, it is not self-evident that this experience will be replicated elsewhere,
and even there regulatory failures have been identified. What seems clear is that a
structured research agenda is needed to improve both understanding of the objectives
and outcomes of regulation in developing countries in relation to poverty reduction and
the effectiveness of regulatory policies. This research should centre on providing answers
to the following questions.
1. To what extent do regulators in developing countries actively prioritise access by the
poor to vital services and what measures do they adopt to improve access and
prevent disconnections for payment failure? Are tariff schedules authorised that
prioritise income distribution goals over allocative efficiency?
There is evidence that some regulators are prioritising services for the poor but the
results are uneven. Some regulators are not mandated to pursue poverty reduction
but nevertheless appear to do so, while others may be so mandated but fail to do so.
Knowledge is limited on both the legal requirements and actions of regulators in
relation to poverty reduction.
2. How is the affordability issue addressed and how do regulators interface with other
government departments concerned with social welfare—is there joined up
government on poverty reduction? Are subsidies or cross-subsidies used to pay for
connection costs and to reduce volume charges for low-levels of consumption, for
example through the use of “life line” tariffs?
There is evidence that affordability concerns are real with the poor often finding it
difficult to afford the improved infrastructure services offered after privatisation.
However, as the above review has highlighted, information is contradictory on how
well the interests of the poor are being met.
3. What administrative and regulatory capacity exists and how does the resourcing of
regulatory agencies impact on the ability to tackle poverty issues?
There is evidence of significant administrative weaknesses in regulatory agencies in
developing countries. In particular, regulatory offices tend to be undermanned and
the necessary regulatory skills and the data bases needed to regulate effectively are
absent. The extent to which resource deficiencies thwart the achievement of
regulatory policies aimed at helping the poor is unclear, but they might be expected
to be significant.
4. To what extent are regulatory offices in developing countries subject to capture and
to what extent does this bias regulatory policy against reducing poverty? To what
extent do regulators attempt to obtain information from the poor or their
representatives so as to ensure that regulatory policies do not ignore their needs?
There is evidence from our review of the evidence that some regulatory offices do
endeavour to consult the poor, but it is unclear how universal this policy is. It is
particularly unclear whether the views of the poor are influential in the face of better
resourced interest groups perhaps with high level contacts within Ministries.
Inequality of access to basic services, which is linked to infrastructure provision, is
regarded by many as the basic challenge of development policy (World Bank, 2003). The
theme of this paper is that effective and efficient regulation of infrastructure services has
the potential to reduce both absolute and relative poverty in developing countries.
However, as the paper has demonstrated, there remain large gaps in our knowledge of if
and how regulators are actually approaching poverty as an issue.
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